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The Structure and Function 
of Israeli Employée Associations 
Arie Shirom 
and 
Dan Jacobson 
The first part of this article is devoted to a brief des-
cription of the ideological, political, économie and légal en-
vironment of the employers' associations in Israël. Then, the 
current structures of the three major associations are dis-
cussed, and their external and internai relations are analyzed. 
Finally, some tentative conclusions emanating from the re-
port are presented, and several possible implications of the 
Israeli expérience for employers' associations in other coun-
tries are suggested. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scrutiny of the labor relations literature reveals that the number 
of systematic investigations of the formation, structure and function of 
employers' associations is surprisingly small. For a number of reasons, 
students of labor relations characteristically focused their attention on 
the structure and function of trade union movements. However, there 
are indications that this state of affairs is gradually changing. In récent 
years, researchers hâve increasingly concerned themselves with the shifts 
occuring in the patterns of opération of employers' associations. 
In several Western industrialized countries, employers' associations 
appear to face significant challenges. Members' new needs lead to the 
addition of novel functions and the expansion of old ones. Given the 
current trend toward national eco- I SHIROM, A., Senior Lecturer, De-
partment of Labor Studies, Tel-Aviv 
University, Israël. 
JACOBSON, D., Senior Lecturer, 
Department of Labor Studies, Tel-
Aviv University, Israël. 
nomic policies in those countries, 
the representational responsibilities 
of employers' associations expand. 
Concomitantly, pressures toward 
* Comments made on an earlier version of this paper by Professors Albert 
Blum, Milton Derber and Joseph Lowenberg are gratefully acknowledged. 
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their structural consolidation émerge. Solutions worked out for some of 
thèse problems in Israël may well be of interest to students of labor relations 
in other industrialized countries and may provide a relevant référence 
point for comparative research in this area. 
To a varying extent, employers' associations are a product of the 
économie and social development of the society in which they originated. 
Thus, the paper's first objective is to outline some of the background 
conditions for the growth and présent position of the Israeli employers' 
associations. The paper's second objective is to identify the factors which 
explain the structural and functional changes which hâve occured in the 
associations in récent years. Some of thèse factors, in turn, are respons-
ible for their récent progression from minor participants to influential 
partners in the country's labor relations system. The analysis is set in a 
broader frame of référence which enables comparison with other indus-
trialized societies. x 
Employers' associations hâve been given various définitions, de-
pending on the investigator's aim.2 For the purpose of this inquiry, they 
are defined as voluntary associations of employers who combine for the 
promotion and défense of employers' interests in labor relations. Thus 
trade associations, entrepreneurial organizations such as chambers of 
commerce, and related types of associations which concern themselves 
predominantly with the product market of their members are excluded 
from this study. In Dunlop's terms, we refer to one of the actors in the 
industrial relations System whose interactions with the other actors dé-
termine the norms of behavior in the system.3 
It should be recognized that employers' associations may also per-
forai the functions of trade associations — such as lobbying in support 
of économie législation or providing direct économie services to mem-
bers. Similarly, trade associations may periodicaiïy undertake to rep-
resent their members' labor relations interests vis-a-vis labor unions or 
1
 Most of the documentary materials upon which this paper is based are 
of an ephemeral nature, and in Hebrew. Due to space limitations, only English-
language références and Hebrew-language statistical material are cited. To avoid 
cumbersomeness, no spécifie références are made to interviews held with executive 
officers in the associations. 
2
 See: Clarence E. BONNETT, Employers' Association, Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, N.Y., The Macmillan Co., 1961, pp. 509-514. 
3
 John T. DULOP, Industrial Relations Systems, 111., Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press, 1958, pp. 15-16. 
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government. Consequently, the distinction between thèse two types of 
business associations is a matter of degree rather than of kind. In most 
cases, however, an association may be categorized in one of thèse two 
types on the basis of functions which are prédominant. 
As elsewhere, employers' associations in Israël hâve not been an 
object of extensive research. This is partly due to their réticence to pu-
blicly reveal any information about their opérations. The latter charac-
teristic probably stems from traditions of secrecy associated with the still 
extensively existing family-owned firms. Another possible explanation of 
students' reluctance to investigate employers' associations is the relatively 
minor rôle which the associations hâve played until very recently in the 
labor relations system. 
THE BACKGROUND 
The ideological and Political Environment 
The organized movement of the Jewish people to rebuild Palestine 
as a national homeland started in the 19th century, while the country 
was under Ottoman rule. However, the actual industrial development 
of the country may be traced to the years after World War I, v/hen the 
country was ruled by Britain under a mandate from the League of Nations 
until Israël obtained its independence in 1948. 
As judged by contemporary standards, the mandatory Government 
followed very libéral économie policies. Thus, the public sector was 
relatively underdeveloped, and refrained from direct involvement in the 
country's industrialization. As a matter of policy, the mandatory Govern-
ment discouraged Jewish immigration to Palestine. The main burden of 
économie development and absorption of immigrants fell upon the Jew-
ish community's représentative political institutions, which were assisted 
in this task by funds collected in the diaspora. Zionist-Socialist parties 
were at the helm of thèse institutions during most of the period under 
considération. 
The Zionist-Socialist parties which hâve formed the ruling élite of 
the Jewish community's political system followed a future-oriented col-
lectivistic ideology. Their ideology included specifically defined objectives 
in the sphères of immigration, external security, foreign relations, and 
the development of communal welfare services. While most political 
groupings in the Jewish community subscribe to thèse objectives (as 
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defined by this community's central political bodies), no concensus was 
achieved regarding the means through which thèse objectives are to be 
effectively reached. Significantly, the important components of this ide-
ology were concerned with the envisaged national and social renaissance 
of the Jewish people in Israël ; économie objectives, such as économie 
independence and growth, attained prominence only after the country's 
independence. 
In 1920, thèse Zionist-Socialist parties agreed to combine several 
areas of activity in which they had been involved, and transferred them 
to a new organization which they had established : the Histadrut, Israel's 
multi-functional labor movement. It was set up as a mass organization 
for supplying most of the économie and social needs of its members, 
while the parties which founded it retained their representational func-
tion in the political sphère. Until Independence, the Histadrut operated 
in many ways as the State's harbinger. Ideologically, it was committed 
to the realization of a 'Jewish working society' in Palestine. In practice, 
it was the most important and powerful pre-State mass organization. 
Throughout its existence, the Histadrut followed économie policies which 
reflected a broad, self-avowed social responsibility. 4 
The Histadrut currently comprises over 80% of the country's labor 
force. It provides its members with a comprehensive health insurance 
program, pension plans and other welfare services. The latter schemes 
are ail managed by the Histadrut alone, without the direct participation 
of employers. The Histadrut also acts as a large-scale employer and 
économie entrepreneur. It controls and opérâtes varied enterprises in 
most branches of the economy. This rôle of the Histadrut is especially 
noteworthy when one considers the relative power of the participants in 
the Israeli labor relations System. 
Most important employers' associations in Israël were established 
during the twenties. They faced a labor relations System in which 
4
 Useful références are: (1) Zweig, The Israeli Worker, N.Y., Herzel Press 
and Sharon Books, 1959; (2) Sobel, «Israël», in Walter Galenson (ed), Labor 
in Developing Economies, Berkeley, Cal., University of California Press, 1962; 
(3) Halevi, «The Israeli Labor Movement», The Annals, Vol. 310, (March 
1957), pp. 172-182; (4) United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Labor Law and Practice in Israël: BLS Report No. 315, Washington D.C., 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967; (5) Derber, M. « Plant Labor Relations 
in Israël», Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 17 (1963), pp. 39-60; 
(6) Shirom, A. «Workers' Committees in the Israeli Labour Relations System: 
An Appraisal », Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 2 (1), Spring, 1971, pp. 66-79. 
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workers' représentatives could draw upon the considérable political power 
of the political parties which formed the Histadrut. Histadrut-affiliated 
national unions usually had direct access to the power resources of thèse 
parties. As noted, the same political parties were dominant in the regu-
lative and allocative institutions of the Jewish community since the early 
thirties. 
The Economie Environment 
While the detailed story of Israel's économie development is readily 
available elsewhere,5 it is pertinent to this inquiry to présent the sectoral 
structure of employed wage earners. Understandably, the way in which 
employées are distributed across sectors détermines the boundaries of 
the legitimate jurisdiction of employers' associations in private employ-
ment. Table 1 represents this information with a three-sector classifi-
cation. The public sector in Table 1 includes government and national 
institutions such as the Jewish Agency. 
Overall, it appears that the public sector accounts for about one-
third and the Histadrut sector for about one-fifth of total wage employ-
ment, with the private sector providing the remaining portion of about 
one-half. Owing to the importance of employment in the Histadrut-owned 
enterprises, the share of the private sector is quite low when compared 
with other non-Communist countries. Parenthetically, it may be noted 
that an examination of the sectoral composition of domestic product may 
lead to almost identical conclusions. 6 The Histadrut sector is an im-
portant employer in agriculture, transport (owing to the bus coopérat-
ives), and construction. The public sector stands out as the rnost im-
portant employer in the traditional public utilities, apart from the go-
vernment services. 
The Légal Environment 
Most employers' associations, as well as most national trade unions 
affiliated with the Histadrut, hâve formed légal personalities by register-
ing under the gênerai Law of Associations. This law was promulgated 
by the Ottoman rulers of Palestine in 1909. It relates to ail non-profit 
associations, allowing them a virtually free hand in handling their internai 
5 N. HALEVI, and R. KLINOV-MALUL. The Economie Development oj 
Israël N.Y., Praeger, 1968, ch. 2. 
6 Ibid., pp. 113-115. 
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TABLE 1 
Employées by Economie Branch and Sector, 1909 (in percentage)^ 
Sector 1 
% 
r
otal 
conomic Branch Private Public Histadrut ( n ) * 
Total 48% 34% 1 18% 100% (723.5) 
Agriculture 33 32 35 100 (40) 
Industry 76 10 14 100 (206) 
Construction 46 21 33 100 (56) 
Electricity & Water 2 94 4 100 (14) 
Commerce & Banking 61 14 25 100 (74) 
Transport & 
Communications 18 53 29 100 (53) 
Public & Business 
Services 30 57 13 100 (250) 
Personal Services 78 15 7 100 (31) 
* Percentages are rounded. 
* Monthly average number of employées, in thousands, rounded. 
1
 Of this, about 6% are employed in the Private non-profit sector, mostly 
in the business services branch. 
Source: State of Israël, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistîcal Abstract of Israël 
1970, No. 21. Jérusalem, the Bureau, 1971, p. 292-3. 
and external affairs. The very few formai requirements which restrict 
their activities somewhat are, in practice, seldom enforced. 7 The very 
thin légal foundation of the vast économie activities of non-profit asso-
ciations has not escaped public awareness. In view of the growing écon-
omie importance of thèse associations, the Government moved to revise 
the law in the early fifties when a new revison was submitted to the Is-
raeli Parliament. To date however, the revised law has not yet been 
enacted. 
7 I. ZAMIN, «Trade Unions and Employers' Associations: The Légal Si-
tuation», in Friedman, A. (éd.) Structural Changes in Labor Unions, Tel Aviv, 
Industrial Relations Research Association of Israël, 1972, pp. 59-105 (Hebrew, 
with an English summary, pp. xxii-xxvii). As Zamin notes, since the Law of 
Associations prohibits employers' associations from engaging in profit-making 
activities, they hâve channeled thèse activities to affiliated organizations formed 
under other laws. 
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As a conséquence, the légal environment of employers' associations 
is relatively unstructured. They are required neither to submit any records 
nor even to incorporate. In fact, several important trade unions, and some 
employers' associations, chose not to incorporate. This state of affairs 
is an additional explanation for the paucity of written material about 
employers* associations. 
THE STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS 
There are several noteworthy characteristics common to most em-
ployers' associations in Israël which set them apart from their opposite 
numbers in other industrialized countries in Western Europe. 
Israeli associations were formed on an industry-wide basis which 
usually coincided with product and labor markets. Studies conducted on 
associations in the United States found that this basis of formation pro-
vided optimal chances for their survival and internai cohésion.8 Denom-
inational or ideological différences, which caused splits and divisions in 
several European fédérations of employers, hâve had negligible influence 
on employers' associations in Israël. This is probably accounted for by 
the fact that the latter are, by and large, mutations of earlier trade asso-
ciations which were formed to défend their members' narrowly defined 
économie interests in the product market. The development of the Ma-
nufacturers' Association of Israël, detailed below, is a typical example 
of the transformation of a trade association into an employers' associa-
tion. 
By définition, ail Israeli associations negotiate collective agreements 
on behalf of their members ; they do not, however, take part in contract 
administration, except for their participation in the last step of the usual 
grievance settlement procédure. As already noted, and contrary to the 
prévalent practice in other industrialized countries, most associations are 
not involved in administering health insurance programs or pension 
plans for their constituency ; thèse, as well as several important welfare 
schemes, are administered by the Histadrut. 
Unlike the prevailing situation in Europe, but similar to the U.S. 
pattern, an individual employer is usually directly affiliated to his na-
8 See références quoted in K. M. McCAFFREE, «A Theory of the Origins 
and Development of Employer Associations», in Somers, G. G. (éd.) Proceedings 
of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Associations, 
Wis., The Association, 1963, pp. 63, 65. 
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tional association. Most associations hâve established régional (or sub-
branch) divisions, but most of thèse metropolitan building blocks are 
simply administrative units with very limited autonomy. Consequently, 
it may be concluded that employers' fédérations in the true sensé of this 
term do not exist in Israël. Again diverging from accepted practices in 
most European countries, 9 Israeli associations do not make public any 
information regarding their membership. 
On the basis of their prominence or spécial significance in the labor 
System, three employers' associations were selected for more detailed 
description. They are : (1) the Manufacturers' Association of Israël, 
which covers most branches of manufacturing industry ; (2) the Farm-
ers' Association, which represents private agriculture ; and (3) the Ar-
tisans' Association, covering small handicraft industries. Occasionally, 
référence is made to the Building Contractors' Association. Other asso-
ciations in existence are predominantly trade or entrepreneurial asso-
ciations, and hâve consequently been excluded from this study's domain 
of inquiry. They include : The Diamond Manufacturers' Association, 
Cinéma Owners' Association, Garage Owners' Association, Chambers of 
Commerce, Association of Life Insurance Companies, Association of 
Merchants, Hôtel Owners' Association, and the Association of Banks. 
The Manufacturers' Association of Israël 
This Association, henceforth abbreviated as MAI, was formally 
established in 1920, but it started to operate only in 1923. It is the most 
powerful and influential employers' association ; now the officially rec-
ognized représentative of private industry, it is the leading member of 
the Coordinating Committee of Employers' Associations (discussed 
below). 
Manufacturing activity on a significant scale began in the Jewish 
sector of Palestine only with the outbreak of World War II. As a resuit 
of the cessation of commercial transportation during the war, local in-
dustry was granted almost total protection from foreign compétition. By 
virtue of contacts established by MAI with the Middle-East Supply Centre 
of the Allied Forces, local manufacturing industry became an increas-
ingly important supplier of war-related materials. This resulted in a 
substantial expansion in most branches of industry. 
9 See, as an example, J. P. WINDMULLER, «Employers and Employers' 
Associations in the Netherlands Industrial Relations System », Relations Indus-
trielles, Vol. 22, Jan. 1967, pp. 57-59. 
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Until this war-related industrial growth, MAI operated primarily 
as a trade association. It attempted to act as an économie interest group 
both with respect to the central political institutions of the Jewish com-
munity and the British Mandatory Government. MAI tried to influence 
the Jewish national institutions which allocated the funds raised by the 
world-wide Zionist movement to channel the funds not only into agri-
cultural development but also to industry. During the late thirties, MAI 
gradually expended its direct économie services to members, such as 
the financial services provided by an affiliated bank. 
The period of sustained industrial expansion which began with the 
Second World War was accompanied by considérable pains of growth 
which were most pronounced in labor relations. The Mandatory Govern-
ment was anxious to keep the flow of war materials and supplies unin-
terrupted by labor disputes. To this end, it introdueed, on a country-
wide basis, several emergency labor procédures. Most important among 
thèse were cost-of-living allowances, made necessary by war-time in-
flation, and compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. In the actual im-
plementation of thèse procédures, MAI came to be recognized by both 
the government and the Histadrut as the représentative of private em-
ployers. Thèse developments significantly increased MAI's involvement 
in labor relations on an industry-wide basis. During the war years, 
several collective bargaining agreements were signed between MAI and 
Histadrut-affiliated national trade unions. By 1946, the great majority of 
ail employées in private industry were covered by collective agreements. 
From a structural viewpoint, MAI's activities are departmentalized 
according to two major criteria. Down at the bottom of MAI's hierarchy 
are the industrial branch sections. Most important among them are the 
Métal and Electronics Industry Section and the Textile Industry Section. 
Thèse sections are semi-autonomous in économie matters, with each 
managed by an appointed officiai — who, in turn, is directed by a com-
mittee of elected members. Above this level are the centralized staff 
departments, under the gênerai supervision of MAI's General Director 
who is an appointed officer. Noteworthy among them are the Economie 
Department and the Labor Department, which are responsible for the 
implementation of MAI's policies in thèse areas. Like the industrial 
branch sections, they are headed by appointed officiais and hâve each 
a committee of elected MAI members as overseers. The Presidium and 
the Executive Council are the équivalent of MAI's cabinet and parlia-
ment, respectively. 
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The Labor Department has sole authority for negotiating industry-
wide collective agreements, and must be informed on plant-level agree-
ments. This rather centralized structure of power in MAI was achieved 
only after a prolonged internai debate, in which the industrial branch 
sections struggled to be the locus of decision-making in labor matters. 
Those in MAI's Presidium who argued against a decentralized structure 
finally won their case by pointing out the inefficiencies and disadvantages 
of confederating an employers' association in a tiny country such as 
Israël. Currently, représentatives of the industrial branch sections par-
ticipate in the industry-wide collective bargaining negotiations conducted 
by the Labor Department. 
Nominally, MAI's by-laws stipulate that it organizes « . . . manu-
facturing firms employing at least ten employées and using mechanical 
equipment. > 10 In practice, MAI accepts as a member any privately-
owned manufacturing firm having a so-called « industrial character, •» 
regardless of size.11 Each member-firm has a vote in the bi-annual élec-
tions to the executive Council and the Presidium élections which take 
place in the General Assembly. Membership figures (which, as noted, 
are not made public) appear to fluctuate — with more members joining 
during periods of économie dépression, when MAI's direct économie 
services are most valuable. 
MAI's policy-making processes hâve traditionally been informai. 
They take place in ad-hoc groupings of the more eminent members of 
the Presidium. As a conséquence, the personal leadership style of MAI's 
past présidents has had a considérable impact on the Association's poli-
cies. Arie Shenakar, a textile manufacturer who ruled the Association 
from its formai establishment in 1923 to 1959, kept its staff to the bare 
minimum necessary. During his tenure, most executive duties, including 
routine contacts with government's officialdom, were handled by a small 
group of volunteer-industrialists. The process of building up the Asso-
ciation's staff was started in the early sixties. At présent, MAI's staff 
includes a number of professionals, such as economists, engineers and 
lawyers. It is noteworthy that other employers' associations employ hardly 
any staff experts. 
io Quoted in: J. Y. TABB, Y. AMI, and G. SHAAL, Labor Relations in 
Israël, Tel Aviv, Dvir, 1961, p. 158-159 (Hebrew). 
11
 Communication from Mr. Y. HOUSMAN, Director of MAI's Labor De-
partment, January 1971. 
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The strike insurance fund established by MAI in 1965 is probably 
its most important innovation in labor relations in the last décade. The 
fund provides strike relief to member-firms who sustain losses because 
of a production impairment caused by a labor dispute. The financial as-
sistance which the fund provides usually covers a substantial portion of 
the losses. It therefore strengthens the employers' position in labor dis-
putes relative to that of an Histadrut-affiliated union, even though it is 
customary for workers involved in a Histadrut-approved strike to recoup 
wages lost in the strike from the employers involved as part of the seule-
ment. 
The Farmer's Association 
Several régional trade-organizations of farmers were formed in 
Palestine at the turn of the century. In 1927 thèse régional associations 
united to establish the Farmers' Association. Currently, its membership 
includes most private orchardists and small farmowners in the country. 
The Association accepts only individual farmers as members, and not 
settlements or corporate bodies. 
During the first two décades of its exitence, it functioned primarily 
as a trade association. It organized and developed a host of subsidiary 
institutions, like marketing coopératives and an agricultural school ; it 
was involved also in initiating new settlements. 
In matters of labor relations, the Association was relatively inactive 
for several reasons. First, the officiai position it adopted was that col-
lective labor relations involving the Association as such were incongruent 
with the seasonal and temporary nature of most agricultural jobs. Second, 
it claimed that it was impractical to attempt to introduce collective labor 
relations into the agricultural sector, which was characterized by diffused 
patterns of ownership and a wide variety of products. Third, and per-
haps most important, during the twenties and most of the thiities the 
majority of hired workers were unorganized, low-paid Arabs. As from 
1932 and onward up to 1939, waves of immigration substantially in-
creased the supply of labor available to citricultural jobs. The Histadrut, 
representing thèse newly arrived Jewish laborers, strove to eliminate Arab 
work in the citrus groves — then the primary source of employment in 
the economy — and to replace it with Jewish work. A bitter conflict 
ensued between the Histadrut and the Farmers' Association. The His-
tadrut stood for collectivistic goals, namely, the absorption of immi-
grants and the normalization of the économie struture of the Jewish 
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population of Palestine. The Farmers' Association espoused in this 
struggle the économie interest of its members in keeping the compétitive 
strength of citric fruits in the European export markets. This conflict 
was finally resolved when the 1936-39 riots, inspired by militant Arab 
nationalists, broke out. The riots intensified the political struggle between 
the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine and brought about the 
effective ségrégation of the Arab labor market from the Jewish labor 
market. 
The early fifties were marked by the Government's drive to increase 
the efficiency of production as part of the accentuated primacy of the 
goal of économie growth. Payment-by-results Systems were introduced 
in most citriculture jobs. The National Union of Agricultural Workers 
followed at that time a whipsawing policy of bargaining. The Association 
reacted by demanding that the informai bargaining sessions that preceded 
each season in citriculture, which had characterized the parties' relation-
ship till then, be replaced by a highly structured, industry-wide collective 
agreement. This development marked the graduai ascendancy of the As-
sociation^ rôle in the labor relations System of the agricultural sector. 
The first formai collective agreement was signed in citriculture only in 
1954, covering the packers, their helpers, and related trades. A few 
years later, the parties extended their agreements to cover most agricul-
tural jobs. In 1970, the Association was formally recognized by the 
Ministry of Labor as the représentative of ail private employers in agri-
culture. 
Labor relations in agriculture are often posited by practitioners in 
this field to be an exemplar of industrial peace. Indeed, strikes and 
lockouts are a rare occurence in agriculture. Most grievances are resolved 
in the multi-level System of bi-partite committees which hâve been de-
veloped by the parties over the last two décades. In comparison with other 
industrialized countries, this appears to be a highly institutionalized Sys-
tem of labor relations. Evidently, the successful mutation which the As-
sociation underwent in the early fifties — from an économie interest 
group to an employers' association — was instrumental in bringing this 
about. 
The Artisans' Association 
A strict application of the earlier définition of an employers' asso-
ciation would probably disqualify this association from inclusion in this 
study. First, membership in it is open to both self-employed craftsmen 
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and small-scale employers in ail économie branches. Second, its activities 
hâve traditionally been concerned with serving the économie interests 
of its membership, to the relative neglect of labor relations functions. 
Thus, it has been active primarily in providing its members with needed 
crédit and reasonably-priced manufacturing premises, and ensuring that 
they get favorable treatment from state and municipal tax authorities. 
Nevertheless, it warrants inclusion hère on two considérations : ( 1 ) while 
artisans and small craft industries in most other industrialized countries 
are hardly organized, this Israeli association has succeeded in organizing 
an estimated 40% of the potential membership ; (2) In contrast to 
other employers' associations which strive to retain an image of political 
neutrality, the Artisans' Association willingly affiliated with the dominant 
political party in Israël ; the Labor Party. 
Established in 1906, it is the oldest employers' association. It re-
mained a small and weak fédération, with little authority over its local 
branches, until the mid-fifties. Then, small-scale manufacturing assumed 
growing importance in the Government's efforts to rapidly expand em-
ployment in labor-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, leather 
goods, wood and furniture, and footwear. Consequently, the number of 
self-employed artisans increased. In the fiscal year 1971/72, there were 
14,166 establishments employing less than 5 employées in manufacturing 
alone. Thèse small workshops accounted for only 3.5% of gross output 
and 4.0% of net added value in this sector of the economy. n 
Like any other sizable organized interest group, it soon became a 
target for pénétration by political parties. The capture of the Association's 
executive bodies was achieved by the Labor Party in the late fifties. The 
détails of this conquest are available elsewhere. 13 The Labor Party, which 
has traditionally been at the helm of the Government (though in coalition 
with other parties), utilized its control of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry to channel resources to the Association — thus enabling it to 
effectively supply tts membar-artisans' économie needs. During the 
sixties, the party-member executive officers of the Association success-
fully transformed it from a highly factionalized and splintered organiza-
tion into the most powerful and cohesive trade association in the country. 
12
 State of Israël, Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
Supplément Séries, Vol. 24 (6), 1973, p. 51. 
13
 Peter Y. MEDDING, Mapai in Israël: Political Organisation and Govern-
ment in a New Society, England, Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 53-59. 
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The Labor Party's virtual control over the Association's affairs has 
had far-reaching conséquences for the latter's conduct in labor-manage-
ment negotiations. It viewed the Histadrut not as an opponent in labor 
matters but as a friendly patron. In fact, on one occasion the Association's 
General Secretary voiced his astonishment over the Histadrut's fàilure 
to make financial contributions to his organization, the majority of whose 
members are also Histadrut members. He avoided mentioning the do-
minant position of the Labor Party in both organizations.14 
The inhérent weakness of the Association in labor relations stems 
not only from its being an appendage of the Labor Party but also from 
its highly heterogenous industrial composition and from the fact that 
its members employ but a tiny minority of the employées in most of the 
branches in which it has members. The Association signed industry-
wide collective agreements in only three branches : shoes, printing, and 
building and furniture carpentry. Even in thèse three agreements, wages 
and work conditions generally follow those set in agreements signed by 
MAI in related branches. The Labor Relations department of the Asso-
ciation, staffed by two lawyers, engages primarily in counseling individual 
employers on matters of grievance arbitration or adjudication in the 
Labor Courts. 
The Coordinating Bureau of Economie Association (CBEA) 
The CBEA is the umbrella organization for most trade and em-
ployers' associations. It was first proposed to the other associations by 
the Farmers' Association in 1960. At that time, the Président of the 
Farmers' Association thought that developments in the economy and in 
the labor relations System had made a formai mechanism for coopération 
among employers' associations both feasible and désirable. He contended 
that the loose and informai coordination and exchange of information 
which characterized relationships among employers' associations in the 
past were no longer sufficient.15 It took seven years of extended talks 
to obtain agreement of the majority of associations 16 to form the CBEA. 
14
 See the Association's newsletter Hauman, 59, Sept., 1969, pp. 2-3, (Hebrew). 
15 Communication from Mr. Ziv-Av, now chairman of CBEA's Executive 
Committee, January 1972. 
16
 Among employers' associations in the private sector, the Artisans' Asso-
ciation is the only one which did not join the CBEA. Its avowed reason was 
CBEA's refusai to grant it a seat on the Presidential Council, which manages 
CBEA's affairs. 
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Even then, CBEA's by-laws had to explicitly provide for the sovereignty 
and independent action of each member in practically every important 
issue deliberated by the CBEA. 
CBEA represents a heterogenous body of members. It includes both 
trade and employers' associations. It covers associations in most branches 
of the economy, of varying sizes and scopes of opérations. This rnay be-
come a source of strength ; however, given CBEA's présent constitution, 
it is largely a handicap. 
With regard to labor relations, CBEA formerly served mainly as a 
coordinating board for the various employers' associations with interests 
in this field. This state of affairs has changed markedly since 1970. The 
change was effected primarily by the advent of a national price and wage 
policy in that year. 
During discussions on wage policy for 1970-71, CBEA appeared 
for the first time as the représentative of employers' associations in the 
country, and was recognized by the other two parties in the talks — the 
Government and the Histadrut. The signing of the so-called 'Package 
Deal' — the economy-wide wage agreement for the years 1970-71 — was 
the turning point in CBEA's labor relations activity. Since then., it has 
represented employers in most multi-branch collective bargaining nego-
tiations. 
From a wider perspective, CBEA's establishment may be regarded 
as an attempt to build a 'countervailing power' of employers in the labor 
relations System. Thus far, it has presented only a slight challenge to the 
dominancy of the Histadrut in the System. Some of CBEA's founders 
hoped and expected it to evolve into a centralized fédération of em-
ployers' associations, with formai authority to détermine common labor 
policies binding on ail members. To date, there are no indications that 
such a development is taking place. The labor policies that CBEA has 
adopted usually reflect a consensus reached among members on a certain 
issue ; majority votes were avoided in order to keep away from internai 
confrontations. CBEA's resources are voluntarily contributed by its 
members, and it is dépendent upon MAI's staff for most technical and 
scientific information. It should, however, not be viewed as a mère cover 
for MAI, although the latter is certainly its most influential member. 
CBEA has been conceived, and to a large extent already opérâtes, as a 
separate and relatively independent umbrella organization. The CBEA 
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has successfully established itself as the legitimate représentative of pri-
vate employers in the country, and has been very active and effective in 
its lobbying activities involving économie matters such as tariffs, new 
tax législations and related matters. However, its continued growth and 
accumulation of power are constricted by the aforementioned structural 
handicaps and constitutional constraints. 
INTERNAL RELATIONS 
Leadership : Démocratie or Oligarchie ? 
Like trade unions, employers' associations constitute a type of 
what has been categorized as mutual-benefit associations. Blau and Scott 
— who originally proposed this taxonomy 17 — contended that thèse 
associations are characterized by « . . . Mechanisms for ascertaining what 
their members' collective objectives are as well as mechanisms for imple-
menting them, and the ascertaining of objectives requires démocratie self-
government and freedom of dissent. » In practice, however, one often 
finds that mutual-benefit associations deviate to a certain extent from 
this model of démocratie government. Administrative rationality — the 
logic of goal implementation — tends to be incompatible with the pre-
scribed norms of démocratie goal formation. The resulting incompatibi-
lities are often resolved by centralizing decision-making and control, 
with the accompanying oligarchie tendencies. There is some évidence 
suggesting that employers' associations are vulnérable to such tenden-
cies. 18 
An attempt was made to ascertain the extent to which oligarchie 
tendencies did appear in the associations studied. The following criteria 
of oligarchie control in organizations were used : (1) récurrent recruit-
ment of associations' présidents from the same group ; (2) low turn-
17 p. M. BLAU, and W. R. SCOTT, Formai Organizations, Cal., Chandler 
Publishing Co., 1963, p 252 
18
 EHRMANN, Organized Business in France, Princeton, N.J., Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1957, ch. 3; WINDMULLER, « Employers and Employers Associa-
tions... » op. cit., p 62; M. S. WORTMAN, « Shifts in the Philosophy, Functions 
and Structure of Metropolitan Employers' Associations in the United States, 
1890-1964, » a paper submitted to Second World Congress of the International 
Industrial Relations Associations, Geneva, Switzerland, September 1970. In as much 
as an employers' association fulfills functions which are of peripheral importance 
to their members, attendant membership apathy may further reinforce thèse oligar-
chie tendencies. 
468 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 3 
over of key policy-makers in associations ; (3) absence of internai me-
chanisms to allow a periodical expression of members' views on policy 
lines adopted by associations. 
It appears that the internai relations prevailing in MAI are indi-
cative of those persisting in other employers' associations. MAI's 
présidents and chief policy-makers are traditionally recruited from the 
same small group of industry magnâtes. Actually, the compétition among 
members on seats on MAFs various governmental and administrative 
bodies has always been slight. As noted, MAI's first président ruled the 
association continuously for about thirty years, and the current président 
entered his third term of office at the writing of the paper (1973). MAI 
does not hâve any internai mechanism for regularly consulting its mem-
bers on current issues. In fact, no employers' association in Israël is 
known to hâve established an institution similar to the NAM's consult-
ative body, an organizational entity which allows this American em-
ployers' association ample opportunities to express their diverse views 
on their association's affairs. 
Similar oligarchie trends were identified in other employers' asso-
ciations. In the Building Contractors' Association, for instance, it was 
found that a few active contractors on the governmental bodies of the 
association were holding several offices apiece. In the same vein, the 
Artisans' Association has been run since 1959 by practically the same 
11-member executive board, with other législative bodies dormant. 
Generally speaking, the more sizeable and the higher the économie im-
portance of the enterprise represented by the office-seeker, the better 
his chances of getting elected to the office provided he manifests interest 
and involvement in the activities of the association. 
Maintenance of Members' Loyaity 
Ail voluntary associations need to maintain their members' alle-
gience to the organization as a prerequisite of survival. In this study, 
leaders of employers' associations were found to resort primarily to ma-
terial inducements for the maintenance of rank-and-file loyaity. This em-
phasis on members' instrumental ties with the association has resulted 
in a policy of expending économie services offered by an association to its 
members. As noted by Dubin,19 paternalistic-benevolent managers hâve 
W R. DUBIN, « Attachment to Work and Union Militancy », lndustrial Réfac-
tion, 12, 1973, p. 59. 
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long known that an expansion of the range of welfare services which a 
plant provides to its employées materially lessens the local union's mili-
tancy. 
Similarly, leaders of employers' associations apparently act under 
the assumption that expansion of services to their members effectively 
increases the members' attachment to the associations. 
An opinion survey of samples of two associations' members was 
launched in an attempt to ascertain the validity of the above assumption. 
Members were asked about the importance they attached to the various 
services which their associations provide. Although the samples were 
not représentative, results of both surveys indicated that members' con-
tacts with the two associations were taking place through the économie 
institutions affiliated with them. Thus, 80% of the respondents to the 
questionnaire mailed to members of the Farmers' Association (n = 146) 
paid their membership fées through one of the marketing coopératives 
which the Association had established. Reading through the completed 
questionnaires, one gains the impression that respondents viewed the 
Association as an aggregate of useful économie benefits. Most respon-
dents were unaware of the existence of the Farmers' Association news-
letter, designed to promote members' identification with it. Similar results 
were obtained from the opinion survey of members of the Artisans' As-
sociation. 
Maintenance of Internai Discipline 
This problem, besetting most voluntary associations, appears to 
be relatively more serious in employers' associations. They frequently 
lack effective sanctions which can be applied against nonabiding mem-
bers. In this regard, the existence of a panoply of économie services which 
may be denied to certain members as a disciplinary action is a poten-
tially powerful tool in the hands of associations' officers. MAJ's usage of 
its newly-established strike insurance fund is a case in point. It was re-
ported that about half of MAI's members, employing close to 70% of 
ail employées in MAI's member firms, were members of the fund in 
197i 20 The fund's by-laws stipulate that a member applying for insur-
ance benefits must be a member « . . . in good standing » 21 — in prac-
20 MAI, Report for 1969-1971, Tel Aviv, MAI, 1971, p. 13 (Hebrew). 
21 MAI, Report for 1971-1973, Tel Aviv, MAI, 1973, p. 36 (Hebrew) 
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tice, this has been interpreted to mean that the applicant has complied 
with MAFs labor relations policies. 
Another facet of the same problem is revealed in the decision-making 
strategy generally followed by employers' associations. They avoid bind-
ing majority décisions. Préférence is for consensual decision-making, 
which is least likely to resuit in internai conflict. 22 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
Following is a brief account of the process of politicization of em-
ployers' associations. Their interactions with national unions and the 
Histadrut are excluded ; this is a subject which is dealt with elsewhere. 23 
Relations with the Government 
Between the wars of 1967 and 1973, Israël enjoyed a period of un-
interrupted économie growth coupled with inflationary pressures and 
labor shortages. As in several other European countries, this led to the 
Government's playing an increasingly dominant rôle in the economy. 
National wage and price stabilization policies hâve been in effect since 
1970. 
In démocratie countries, such économie policies can hardly be ef-
fectively implemented without at least the acquiescence of the major 
socio-economic groups. Recognizing this, Israël's Labor-led Government 
actively sought the coopération of employers' associations in carrying 
out national économie policies. New forms and modes of consultation 
ensued, including the establishment of advisory committees and planning 
boards. Thèse developments increased the interdependence of the govern-
ment administration and the employers' associations. In short, they be-
came constituent éléments of the political process at the national level. 
Associations are gradually adjusting to thèse new developments. 
Some adjustments hâve already taken place. MAI and other associations 
hâve reinforced their public relations offices and increased their use of 
22
 Several students of employers' associations noted this feature. See : (1) 
EHRMANN, op. cit.; (2) WINDMULLER, op. cit.; (3) DE VYREN, F. T. 
« Employers' Organizations in the Australian Industrial Relations System, » The 
Journal of Industrial Relations, March, 1971, pp. 30-50. 
23
 A. SHIROM, « Collective Bargaining in Israël », to be published. 
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the mass média to propagate the employers' viewpoint to the gênerai 
public. 24 Their basic attitude toward government-sponsored labor légis-
lation has become appreciably more favourable. Both the Artisans' Asso-
ciation and the Building Contractors' Association are currently lobby-
ing in support of a law restricting the entrance of new entrepreneurs to 
thèse associations' respective industries. Understandably, the requested 
législation calls for the licensing to be performed by the association in 
question. 
Another interesting adjustment concerns the associations' relations 
with firms belonging to the non-private sections of the economy. MAI's 
coopération with State- and Histadrut-owned firms is a case in point. In 
most European countries, such public firms are not accepted as members 
of employers' associations comprised of private employers.25 MAI has 
traditionally followed a similar stand, limiting its legitimate jurisdiction 
to private employers. Recently, however, close coordinative ties with 
respect to labor relations policy hâve developed between MAI's executive 
officers and représentatives of manufacturing firms in both the public 
and Histadrut sectors. At présent thèse contacts are unstructured and 
informai, and take place intermittently. Their acknowledged existence, 
however, probably induced MAI's président to publicly propose to or-
ganize ail employers in manufacturing industry in a « Confédération of 
Israeli Manufacturer. » 26 To cite another example : the Farmers' Asso-
ciation reported that communal coopératives employing hired workers 
covertly sought its advice on labor matters.21 
Relations with Poiitical Parties 
In a poiitical System based on proportional représentation, the élec-
toral power of employers' associations which consist of single firms as 
members tends to be insignificant relative to that of mass organizations 
24 Readers may recall that this is a marked departure from past traditions — 
which conformed to Adam Smith's observation that employers' associations were 
inclined to conduct their affairs with the « utmost silence and secrecy. » See A. 
SMITH, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1. 
6th éd., London, Methuen, 1950. First published 1904, p. 75. 
25 International Organization of Employers. Structure, Scope and Activities of 
National Central Employer Organizations. A report submitted to the 47 Annual 
Meeting, London, June, 1970, (mimeo.). 
26 Ha'aretz (daily newspaper), (15. 6. 1973), p. 5. 
27 Communication from Mr. Rokeach, Director of the Farmers' Association 
Department of Labor Relations, January, 1972. 
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like national unions. As noted, the Artisans' Association was, until re-
cently, the only association openly identified with a political party. There 
are indications that with the progress of the politicization process des-
cribed above, other associations may give overt support to a party or 
bloc of parties. A partial relaxation of the former inhibitions and réser-
vations associated with direct political involvement of employers' asso-
ciations is apparently taking place. Thus, MAI nominated two prominent 
members of the right-of-center political bloc (Gahal) to top executive 
positions in the association in the early 70's, and donations to the same 
bloc by other associations were mentioned in the daily press during the 
1973 parliamentary élection campaign. In addition, top level executive 
positions in MAI, the Farmers' Association, the Artisans' Association and 
the Building Contractors' Association hâve proved instrumental in ad-
vancing the political careers of the holders of thèse positions on either 
the national scène (e.g., membership in parliament) or on the local level 
(e.g., membership in the Tel-Aviv municipal council). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Admittedly, this study lacks sufficient historical depth. The paucity 
of past studies, the meager published information, and the traditions of 
secrecy which characterize the associations combined to make the task 
of data collection more arduous than was initially conceievd. Never-
theless, it does appear that the évidence presented suggests several note-
worthy uniformities in the structure and behavior of employers' asso-
ciations in Israël. 
The most crucial failure of the Israeli employers' associations has 
been their excessive fragmentation and lack of unity. This, among other 
important factors, has led to their inhérent weakness in the face of a 
labor movement which has organized about 80% of ail wage earners in 
the country. This imbalance of power in the labor relations System violâtes 
a well-known theorem regarding the behavior of économie interest 
groups. According to this theorem, any interest group strives to become 
as strong and proficient as the interest group with opposing objectives. 
Furthermore, this theorem was shown to validly account for the findings 
of several studies of employers' associations. 28 Therefore, the persistent 
state of fragmentation and amorphousness of employers' associations 
till very recently calls for an explanation. 
28 D.M. SLATE, « Trade Union Behavior and the Local Employers' Associa-
tion, » Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 11, 1957, pp. 42-55. 
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Several explanatory factors can be singled out. In Palestine as well 
as in Israël, économie policy was always subordinated to political ob-
jectives. 29 Consequently, in order to be influential in public policy-mak-
ing, économie power has had to be translated into political power. The 
failure of employers' associations to make this transformation of power 
in the country's political System may be attributed to the deeply-rooted 
individualiste and compétitive norms which were prévalent among em-
ployers. With the advent of a new génération of managers and the décline 
in the prevalence and importance of family-owned firms, the dominant 
value Systems of employers' associations underwent marked changes. 
Associations appear to hâve adopted a more flexible position relative to 
both government and political parties ; concomitantly, political object-
ives began to émerge in their policy-making processes. Still, one should 
bear in mind that thèse internai changes hâve primarily been associated 
with the continued expansion of the Government's sphère of action in 
récent years. 
The extent to which CBEA's formation was supported by the Go-
vernment in behind-the-scene maneuvers could not be ascertained. Public 
utterances of high-ranking officiais hâve long emphasized the country's 
need for more authoritative représentation of the employers in the System 
of labor relations. Once established, CBEA received full récognition by 
the Ministries with which it customarily interacts.30 This probably paved 
the way for the Histadrut's acquiescing to recognize CBEA as the legi-
timate employers' représentative in the 1970 economy-wide wage nego-
tiations. 
It may be argued that the recently enhanced status and power of 
employers' associations in Israël are a product of environmental factors 
to which they responded. This would be in line with McCaffree's thesis 
that the nature and activities of associations are shaped by environmental 
factors.31 
The growing participation of employers' associations in the pro-
cesses of public policy-making is bound to induce further internai changes 
29 HALEVI and KLINOV-MALUL, The Economie Development of Israël, 
op. cit., p. 30. 
30 This was hailed by its bi-monthly newsletter as the very first significant 
achievement of the CBEA. See : CBEA, A Letter to the Employer, April-May, 
1969 and Sept.-Oct., 1969, et passim (Hebrew). 
3 1
 McCAFFREE, « A Theory of the Origins and Development of Employers' 
Associations, » op. cit. 
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including the evolvement of endogenous sources of adaptation. Given the 
économie power already accumulated by certain associations witliin their 
networks of auxiliary organizations, and their growing ability and willing-
ness to translate this power into politically-valued resources, one may 
conjecture that the past imbalance of power in the labor relations System 
is gradually being rectified in the employers' favor. 
Some Implications of the Israeli Expérience 
Notwithstanding the unique features of Israel's political and éco-
nomie systems noted above, it appears that several tentative generali-
zations, relevant to other countries, may be made on the basis of the 
Israeli expérience. 
1. In industrializing countries, employers' associations frequently 
evolve from earlier trade associations. Their evolvement often nécessitâtes 
difficult-to-make internai adaptations which are achieved through the 
instigation of external change agents. 
2. In a highly politieized labor relations System in which employers' 
associations are either unable or unwilling to translate the économie 
power that they possess to political power, their inferior position in the 
System may persist for a prolonged period of time. 
3. Long-term power imbalances in the labor relations System are 
bound to create problems for ail its participants.32 Under thèse circum-
stances, a government led by labor parties may actively support efforts of 
employers' représentatives to consolidate their power as a counterforce 
to workers' représentatives. 
4. In countries where industrial-like activities of the public sector 
loom large, managers of public enterprises tend to coordinate their labor 
policies with those of associations representing private manufacturers. 
Both parties are inclined to hold thèse contracts in an informai and un-
structured environ. 
5. It may be claimed that an optimal level of control of an em-
ployers' association over its members is achieved when the association 
provides its members with a given combination of material and normative 
inducements.33 
32 M. DERBER, « Plant Labor Relations in Israël », Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, vol. 17, 1963, p. 59. 
33 A. ETZIONI, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, N. Y., 
The Free Press, 1961, pp. 3-11. 
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Structure et fonctions des associations d'employeurs en Israël 
La première partie de cet article décrit le milieu idéologique, politique, éco-
nomique et juridique dans lequel évoluent les associations d'employeurs en Israël. 
Au départ, même si le mouvement de retour du peuple juif en Palestine remonte 
à la domination ottomane, ce n'est qu'après la première guerre mondiale, alors que 
le territoire était sous mandat britannique, que le développement industriel a com-
mencé. À l'époque, la Grande-Bretagne adhérait au libéralisme économique et, par 
conséquent, le secteur public était très peu développé. Sous mandat britannique, 
on ne favorisait pas l'immigration juive en Palestine et le fardeau du développement 
économique et l'intégration des immigrants retombaient sur la communauté juive 
à l'aide de fonds recueillis dans la diaspora. C'étaient les partis sionistes-socialistes 
qui avaient formé l'élite dirigeante de la collectivité juive en l'orientant vers une 
idéologie collective. Aussi, en 1920, fondèrent-ils YHistadrut. Il s'agissait d'un mou-
vement de masse destiné à répondre aux besoins économiques et sociaux de ses 
membres, alors que les partis conservaient leurs fonctions politiques. Jusqu'à l'indé-
pendance, YHistadrut agissait d'une certaine façon comme précurseur de l'État. 
Cette organisation joue un double rôle : elle procure à ses membres différents ser-
vices d'entr'aide sociale ; elle est aussi au sens large un employeur qui est proprié-
taire d'entreprises dans la plupart des branches de l'économie et elle occupe ainsi 
une place importante dans le système des relations de travail en Israël. 
La fondation des associations d'employeurs principales en Israël remontent à 
la décennie 1920 alors que les représentants des travailleurs pouvaient utiliser la 
puissance considérable des partis politiques qui constituaient YHistadrut. 
Par ailleurs, au point de vue économique, le secteur public occupe environ 
un tiers de la main-d'œuvre et YHistadrut, un cinquième. Le reste des travailleurs, 
la moitié à peu près de l'ensemble de la main-d'œuvre, est employée par le secteur 
privé proprement dit. À cause de l'importance de YHistadrut en tant qu'employeur, 
la part du service privé est sensiblement plus faible que dans les autres pays, sauf 
les pays communistes. UHistadrut occupe une place importante dans l'agriculture, 
le transport et l'industrie de la construction. Le secteur public comprend les entre-
prises traditionnelles dont l'exploitation est confiée aux corps publics dans les 
sociétés occidentales. 
La plupart des associations d'employeurs possèdent la personnalité juridique 
en vertu de la loi générale des associations datant aussi loin que 1909 et qui 
permet à toute association sans but lucratif de conduire librement ses affaires tant 
internes qu'externes. À cause de l'importance économique de plus en plus consi-
dérable de ces associations, le gouvernement a entrepris de réviser cette loi au 
cours des années '50, mais la nouvelle législation n'a pas encore été sanctionnée. 
En fait, ceci explique pourquoi les associations d'employeurs sont assez peu struc-
turées, ce qui montre la rareté des documents écrits sur ces associations, lesquelles 
sont assez avares de renseignements. 
Aussi, la plupart des associations d'employeurs en Israël possèdent-elles des 
caractéristiques qu'on ne retrouve pas chez les groupements de même nature en 
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Europe. L'étude de la structure de ces associations constitue la deuxième partie de 
l'article précédent. Celles-ci sont formées sur une base industrielle qui coïncide 
avec la nature du produit et les marchés du travail, ce qui assure leur stabilité et 
leur cohésion interne. Les querelles confessionnelles et idéologiques n'ont guère 
d'influence sur les associations d'employeurs en Israël. La raison en est dans une 
bonne mesure qu'il s'agissait au départ d'organisations strictement professionnelles 
vouées à la défense des intérêts économiques de leurs membres, organisations qui se 
sont graduellement transformées en associations d'employeurs. 
Par définition, toutes les associations d'employeurs israéliennes négocient des 
conventions collectives de travail au nom de leurs membres, mais elles ne participent 
pas à leur administration, si ce n'est au dernier stade de la procédure des réclama-
tions. Elles n'administrent pas non plus les mesures de sécurité sociale qui sont 
gérées par VHistadrut. Les employeurs sont directement membres de l'association 
nationale, mais la plupart de ces associations possèdent des sections régionales. On 
peut donc affirmer qu'il n'existe pas en Israël de fédérations d'employeurs dans le 
sens véritable du terme. Elles ne font pas connaître publiquement le nombre de leurs 
adhérents non plus. 
En pratique, on compte trois grandes associations d'employeurs en Israël : 
l'Association des manufacturiers d'Israël, qui recrute ses membres surtout dans le 
secteur secondaire, l'Association des fermiers qui représente les agriculteurs privés 
et l'association des artisans qui est active dans la petite industrie. Il y a aussi une 
association des entrepreneurs. Les autres groupements ont surtout un caractère 
professionnel. 
L'association la plus influente et la plus puissante est l'Association des manu-
facturiers dont la fondation remonte à 1923. C'est elle qui représente les intérêts 
de l'entreprise privée. Elle a pris du poids au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale 
alors que l'industrie s'est développée rapidement pour satisfaire aux besoins des 
forces armées des Alliés au Moyen Orient. De type professionnel au départ, l'As-
sociation s'est transpormée sous l'effet des conflits ouvriers qui ont accompagné 
l'expansion de l'industrie. Ses sections les plus importantes sont celles de la métal-
lurgie, de l'électronique et du textile. C'est son service des relations du travail qui 
a autorité en matière de négociations collectives à l'échelle nationale. Le processus 
de décision est entre les mains d'un petit groupe de personnages influents. C'est le 
même homme qui en fut d'ailleurs le président de 1923 à 1959. Sa principale inno-
vation dans le domaine des relations de travail fut l'établissement d'un régime 
d'assurance contre les grèves. Ce fonds couvre une bonne part des pertes attribua-
bles aux arrêts de travail, ce qui a pour effet de renforcer la position des employeurs 
dans les conflits. 
Il existe en Israël des associations d'agriculteurs depuis le début du siècle. Ces 
associations se sont regroupées en 1927 pour former l'Association des fermiers. 
Fendant longtemps, elle a gardé les caractéristiques d'une organisation profession-
nelle qui s'est occupée d'institutions subsidiaires : fondation de coopératives de mise 
en marché, d'une école d'agriculture. Elle s'occupait aussi de colonisation. Elle 
était alors assez active dans le domaine des relations du travail, parce qu'elle con-
sidérait que le caractère saisonnier et temporaire du travail agricole et la structure 
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du milieu agricole, secteur formé surtout de petits exploitants, ne se prêtaient pas 
à la négociation collective. Il faut aussi ajouter que, à ce moment, les salariés du 
secteur de l'agriculture étaient des Arabes. C'est l'arrivée de vagues successives 
d'immigrants juifs à partir de la fin des années '30 qui a changé la situation. Ces 
immigrants devinrent des ouvriers agricoles et fondèrent des syndicats pour défendre 
leurs intérêts. La première convention collective, qui régissait les emballeurs et 
leurs aides, fut concilie dans la citriculture en 1954. Depuis, la négociation s'est 
étendue à l'ensemble des emplois agricoles. L'association des fermiers est depuis 
1970 le représentant de tous les employeurs privés dans le secteur agricole où 
règne la paix industrielle. 
Quant à l'Association des artisans, dont l'établissement remonte à 1906, elle 
groupe les propriétaires de petites entreprises dans les industries du textile, du 
vêtement, du cuir et du bois. Elle est assez faible et a peu d'autorité sur ses sec-
tions locales. 
Au-dessus de ces associations, on trouve le Bureau de coordination des asso-
ciations économiques qui comprend à la fois des associations d'employeurs et des 
organisations professionnelles. C'est en 1970-71 que ce Bureau devint pour la pre-
mière fois le représentant des intérêts des employeurs dans les négociations à l'échelle 
du pays. On peut considérer que l'établissement du Bureau fut une tentative en 
vue de contrebalancer la puissance des syndicats et d'établir une politique commune 
dans le domaine des relations professionnelles. On s'efforce d'y arriver par consen-
sus en évitant de s'attaquer à des problèmes trop concrets et qui pourraient faire 
ressortir des divergences de vue profondes entre les différents groupes. 
Enfin, les auteurs consacrent la dernière partie de leur étude au fonctionnement 
interne des associations qui auraient un caractère plutôt oligarchique en ce sens 
que les dirigeants sont presque toujours recrutés à l'intérieur du même groupe, 
que les penseurs des associations sont à peu près toujours les mêmes personnes et 
qu'il n'existe guère de mécanismes qui favoriseraient la diffusion du point de vue 
des membres. Comme, d'autre part, il s'agit d'organisations volontaires dépourvues 
de sanctions efficaces, les conseils d'administration s'efforcent de créer des services 
qui retiennent l'intérêt des membres. Au niveau de l'action politique, les gouver-
nements à tendance socialiste ont recherché d'une façon générale l'appui des asso-
ciations d'employeurs dans l'établissement de leur politique économique de sorte 
que, à mesure que l'État agrandit son champ d'action, il s'établit une certaine 
interdépendance entre l'administration et les associations d'employeurs qui s'adap-
tent aux mesures économiques et collaborent avec les entreprises du secteur public. 
Par ailleurs, l'influence politique des associations d'employeurs est bien mince 
comparée à celle des syndicats sous un système électoral de représentation propor-
tionnelle. Seule l'Association des artisans est affiliée à une formation politique. 
Toutefois, la participation active de certains membres à l'activité des associations 
est souvent le tremplin qui leur permet d'accéder à la politique tant au niveau 
national que local. 
Les auteurs concluent leur article en soulignant que les associations d'em-
ployeurs, trop fragmentées, manquent d'unité et qu'elles ne font pas le poids devant 
les syndicats qui regroupent 80 pour cent des salariés. 
